Nostr Signer for AWS Nitro Enclave

Noauth-enclaved is a nip46 signer to be deployed inside AWS Nitro Enclave. This allows clients to cryptographically verify various claims about the code running on the server, and thus feel (more) confident that their keys won't be stolen.

From AWS:

AWS Nitro Enclaves enables customers to create isolated compute environments to further protect and securely process highly sensitive data... Nitro Enclaves uses the same Nitro Hypervisor technology that provides CPU and memory isolation for EC2 instances... Nitro Enclaves includes cryptographic attestation for your software, so that you can be sure that only authorized code is running...

The security of the AWS Nitro enclaves depends 100% on AWS - if you don't trust AWS then stop reading now and don't use this code.

Read this and this for an independent analysis of the AWS Nitro enclaves' security.

Why put Nostr keys on a server?

After more than 2 years in existence, there is still no reliable nip46 signer. There is a tension between self-custody and reliability of the signer: you either keep the keys on your device (which is unreliable, especially on mobile), or you upload the keys to a signer server (which usually means you are 100% trusting the server to not steal your keys). To learn more about the issue, read here.

AWS Nitro enclaves promise to solve the problem of lack of trust for a particular service. The code running inside an enclave is fully isolated by AWS from the person launching it. The attestation signed by AWS and reproducible open-source code let anyone verify what exactly is happening inside the enclave (as long as one trusts AWS VM infrastructure). For a signer server in particular, this means there's much less chance for your keys to be stolen or hacked. Add to the mix a tie to npubs of people who built and launched the service, and you can use Nostr and WoT to discover and interact with provably safe services running inside AWS enclaves. The noauth-enclaved is the first prototype of such service.

How it works?

An app holding your nsec may discover an instance of noauth-enclaved, may verify it's cryptographic attestation, and may upload your nsec to the instance. Once nsec is uploaded, the server starts processing nip46 requests to your keys. Permissions of apps connected to your keys can be managed using nsec.app - they are saved on Nostr as encrypted events and are immediately discovered by the server. There is also an API (below) for more direct control over the keys.

The attestation announced by the noauth-enclaved as a Nostr event includes a verifiable info about the hashes of the server-side code, an npub of the builder - the person who built the AWS Nitro enclave image, and an npub of the launcher - the person who launched (and is running) the built image on AWS. The service pubkey that signs the instance Nostr event can be used to communicate with the service in an end-to-end-encrypted way over Nostr relays. A section below for Launching the instance can serve as a draft NIP for discovery and verification of services running in AWS Nitro enclaves.

With the above data, clients can verify the validity of every instance event, can choose between builds (re-)produced by different people and instances launched by different people using WOT. Users can also reproduce a build of noauth-enclaved themselves to be sure which code is running in a specific instance.

Properties

The noauth-enclaved service running inside Nitro Enclave provides:

• attestation - a document signed by AWS that specifies hashes of the code image running on the server
• isolation - AWS virtualization layer ensures that whoever launched the enclave does not have access to whatever is happening in the enclave
• reproducibility - the code of noauth-enclaved is open source and reproducibly built into an enclave image, allowing anyone to review it, rebuild it, and compare image hashes to ones published by any running instance
• attribution - each image has a cryptographic link to builder npub that created the image, and launcher npub that is running it, allowing clients to apply WoT filters and other Nostr-enabled interactions
• reliability - the end goal of deploying a signer on a server is achieved without a typical sacrifice of fully trusting a custodial black-box service

Architecture

A process running inside the enclave has no access to persistent file storage, and no direct access to the network. The parent EC2 instance that launches the enclave does not have access to anything happening inside the enclave, and the only way for them to communicate is through a VSOCK interface.

The noauth-enclaved service consists of two processes - one called enclave (running inside the AWS Nitro enclave), and one called parent (running on the parent EC2 instance). The enclave uses socks protocol to forward all it's network requests (to Nostr relays) to the parent over vsock. The parent is running a socks proxy to forward the traffic from vsock to the target relays. This way enclave can receive and process nip46 requests and can accept nsecs provided by clients.

The enclave code is reproducibly built into a docker image and then into AWS Nitro enclave image. The parent process runs a complementary service to supply the enclave process with build and instance metadata (builder and launcher info). The builder info is kind:63795 event (build signature) generated during the enclave image build and tied to the resulting image. The launcher info is kind:63796 event (instance signature) and is tied to the unique EC2 parent instance id. Both build signature andinstance signature events are tied to the attestation produced by a running enclave process, discussed next.

When the enclave process is started, it fetches the build signature and instance signature events from the parent, fetches the attestation from the AWS VM that's running it and validates the events against the attestation to make sure parent isn't misbehaving. The enclave process then generates a service pubkey and publishes a kind:63793 event (instance event) that includes the attestation, build signature and instance signature. The event is published onto launcher and builder outbox relays. A new instance event is published every hour to keep the attestation document fresh (it's signed by AWS and is valid for 3 hours).

Clients discovering the noauth-enclaved instances using instance events can validate all the data included in the events - the attestation, build signature and instance signature are cryptographically tied together. If the instance event is valid, the client can be sure which specific version of the enclaved process is behind the service pubkey, which builder pubkey built the image, and which launcher pubkey is running it. Expected hashes are located in pcrs.json and docker.json files committed to this repo (updated whenever changes are made to the code).

If client and/or user decide to use a particular noauth-enclaved instance, the user's nsec can be imported into the instance by sending a nip46-like request to the service pubkey on a relay, announced in the instance event. After the nsec is imported, the instance starts processing nip46 requests for it.

Building the docker image

A reproducible docker image for the enclave process is produced using BuildKit - it is used under the hood by the docker buildx, but docker doesn't expose the options necessary for reproducibility (rewrite-timestamp=true). Run:

./build-docker.sh

The command launches the BuiltKit's buildctl inside a docker container to produce a docker image in ./build/noauth-enclaved.tar. The docker image metadata is saved to ./build/docker.json, the hashes containerimage.config.digest and containerimage.digest must match for a reproduced image.

Building the enclave image

After docker image is built we can build the enclave image - the .eif file. Installing the AWS Nitro build toolset (nitro-cli) isn't trivial, so it's best to perform the build on a nitro-capable EC2 instance. Suitable instance types are listed here, the build wasn't tested on ARM so don't choose ones with g suffix.

First, install nitro-cli and docker on your EC2 instance. Then build the docker image as above. Next, run:

./build-enclave-signed.sh ${YOUR_NPUB}

This will generate an enclave image at ./build/noauth-enclaved.eif and ./build/pcrs.json file with PCR (platform configuration registers) hashes. These hashes will be included by the enclave VM in an attestation document if this image is launched. Values PCR0, PCR1 and PCR2 must be reproducible from the same docker image.

To tie ${YOUR_NPUB} to the produced .eif image, we will use PCR8 register. The build script will generate a single-use x509 key and will create an x509 certificate self-signed by that key at ./build/crt.pem. The certificate will include O=Nostr and OU=${YOUR_NPUB}.

The build script will ask nitro-cli to sign the .eif with the x509 key and provide the certificate. The fingerprint hash of the certificate will be included as PCR8 in ./build/pcrs.json and will be reported in the attestation. The temporary x509 key is then deleted to avoid leaking it.

Next, a build signature event of kind:63795 will be generated, including tags ["cert", <certificate_base64>] and ["PCR8", <PCR8>]. A nip46 connection to ${YOUR_NPUB} will be established, the event signed and written to ./build/build.json. This event will be supplied to the enclave process and included in the instance event along with the attestation, allowing clients to verify the PCR8 against the certificate and your npub, ensuring that builder info can't be forged.

Launching the instance

First, the parent process should be started:

./launch-parent.sh

It will start two socat processes forwarding vsock ports 1080 and 2080 to the same local tcp ports. It will also launch the parent process that serves socks proxy on 1080 port, and a WebSocket parent server on 2080.

Then you can launch the enclave:

./launch-enclave-signed.sh ${YOUR_NPUB}

This will first ask for your EC2 instance ID, convert it into PCR4 register format, create nip46 connection to ${YOUR_NPUB} (can differ from the builder npub) and produce an instance signature event of kind:63796 with tag ["PCR4", <PCR4>] in a file ./instance/instance.json. It will also copy ./build/build.json to ./instance/build.json. These two files will be served by the parent process to the enclave when it's launched.

The PCR4 value will be reported in an attestation from withing the enclave, and since EC2 instance IDs are unique to any launched instance and never reused, this value ties the enclave to ${YOUR_NPUB} using instance signature event.

Next, nitro-cli will be used to launch a Nitro enclave using the ./build/noauth-enclave.eif image. The enclave process starts with ./enclave.sh, which launches two socat processes to forward tcp ports 1080 and 2080 to the vsock interface, and launches the enclave process of the noauth-enclaved.

The enclave process will generate a new Nostr key to serve as service pubkey. It will then get the attestation from the enclave VM, asking it to include the service pubkey into the public_key field of the attestation document. This way, the attestation ensures that the service pubkey can safely be used to talk to the enclave process.

Next, enclave will make a WebSocket request to 2080 to their parent, supplying the attestation. The parent will verify the validity of the attestation's PCR8 value against build signature from ./instance/build.json and validity of PCR4 value against ./instance/instance.json, and then forward these events to the enclave.

The enclave will validate the received build signature and instance signature events against it's own attestation, and then publish the instance event of kind:63793 with tags ["build", <build-signature-event>], ["instance", <instance-signature-event>] and base64-encoded attestation as content. The PCR values will be included as x tags for discovery on relays. The instance event will be published onto the outbox relays of the builder and launcher.

Example instance event:

{
  "kind": 63793,
  "id": "dcd7769314c4a0dac97afb05ab68cebb94fcd120f4d34355f5e0788b3acd9757",
  "pubkey": "ac116b22152178636e06d75188c260da10ecd54765d3999bcb579c8f530a9441",
  "created_at": 1743516970,
  "tags": [
    [
      "r",
      "https://github.com/nostrband/noauth-enclaved"
    ],
    [
      "name",
      "noauth-enclaved"
    ],
    [
      "v",
      "1.0.0"
    ],
    [
      "m",
      "i-0ffff615a409a72d7-enc0195f17eaba9b385"
    ],
    [
      "x",
      "517a9ec66c4c8e8f3b309c4a4598e2383dff4ec07dfa48617c2d7ec9b1fbf86a597b4376b18114914a31af2ea12a2db6",
      "PCR0"
    ],
    [
      "x",
      "4b4d5b3661b3efc12920900c80e126e4ce783c522de6c02a2a5bf7af3a2b9327b86776f188e4be1c1c404a129dbda493",
      "PCR1"
    ],
    [
      "x",
      "365caf856d5ef95d4ef49b1883367179fd5d40504d75d8b0c8af7672aff3bb37c0026a69c89d170bdc724b53e8423a7d",
      "PCR2"
    ],
    [
      "x",
      "6386cee86c94b2a713c98e1d883134e8f2c019a17a712eb950fde15e9d6667575569c4e5c5e66eb9c920369961025fd2",
      "PCR4"
    ],
    [
      "x",
      "7e3f4c20f65f0a62de884a41ef73fd693c136173fec4ad19336d2ce3b1d63246da3383cbb83cd10dad77d5d1aafcdce1",
      "PCR8"
    ],
    [
      "t",
      "dev"
    ],
    [
      "relay",
      "wss://relay.nsec.app"
    ],
    [
      "expiration",
      "1743527770"
    ],
    [
      "alt",
      "noauth-enclaved instance"
    ],
    [
      "build",
      "{\"id\":\"09826e152bcddce14a72179dc9fc648f8781cc5019de0b03dd83a059b90579ce\",\"created_at\":1743513252,\"pubkey\":\"3356de61b39647931ce8b2140b2bab837e0810c0ef515bbe92de0248040b8bdd\",\"kind\":63795,\"tags\":[[\"-\"],[\"t\",\"dev\"],[\"cert\",\"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\"],[\"PCR8\",\"7e3f4c20f65f0a62de884a41ef73fd693c136173fec4ad19336d2ce3b1d63246da3383cbb83cd10dad77d5d1aafcdce1\"]],\"content\":\"\",\"sig\":\"17f87814835b14c3028789bfc76725a095bcceea59886dfce4dda487bb17eb76858794cdd354ae1f64be39c72ecb7c149e5093e94e7176425aa1214a556389af\"}"
    ],
    [
      "p",
      "3356de61b39647931ce8b2140b2bab837e0810c0ef515bbe92de0248040b8bdd",
      "builder"
    ],
    [
      "instance",
      "{\"id\":\"ba52dbd7d4943068d10030f14b74dc3511698ecf53dff1190c446ffc0749d646\",\"created_at\":1743491523,\"pubkey\":\"3356de61b39647931ce8b2140b2bab837e0810c0ef515bbe92de0248040b8bdd\",\"kind\":63796,\"tags\":[[\"-\"],[\"t\",\"dev\"],[\"PCR4\",\"6386cee86c94b2a713c98e1d883134e8f2c019a17a712eb950fde15e9d6667575569c4e5c5e66eb9c920369961025fd2\"]],\"content\":\"\",\"sig\":\"bd9c2278beb7cd0023e3e8cb8794e1d29ac76e28182cb54240c8f56752f92019233463a643c606362dc996d303db532df88633e1a53532ee0f23d724df89e1dd\"}"
    ],
    [
      "p",
      "3356de61b39647931ce8b2140b2bab837e0810c0ef515bbe92de0248040b8bdd",
      "launcher"
    ]
  ],
  "content": "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",
  "sig": "391a1beafa5432c78cb176b1e1e899a1c61e80fbf97ccec94a6575d657452c10214494a0504cc81568baf7ebd1c63790c77265bcca7184ed159d676259c5c78a"
}

Matching build signature example (from build tag):

{
  "id": "09826e152bcddce14a72179dc9fc648f8781cc5019de0b03dd83a059b90579ce",
  "created_at": 1743513252,
  "pubkey": "3356de61b39647931ce8b2140b2bab837e0810c0ef515bbe92de0248040b8bdd",
  "kind": 63795,
  "tags": [
    [
      "-"
    ],
    [
      "t",
      "dev"
    ],
    [
      "cert",
      "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"
    ],
    [
      "PCR8",
      "7e3f4c20f65f0a62de884a41ef73fd693c136173fec4ad19336d2ce3b1d63246da3383cbb83cd10dad77d5d1aafcdce1"
    ]
  ],
  "content": "",
  "sig": "17f87814835b14c3028789bfc76725a095bcceea59886dfce4dda487bb17eb76858794cdd354ae1f64be39c72ecb7c149e5093e94e7176425aa1214a556389af"
}

Matching instance signature example (from instance tag):

{
  "id": "ba52dbd7d4943068d10030f14b74dc3511698ecf53dff1190c446ffc0749d646",
  "created_at": 1743491523,
  "pubkey": "3356de61b39647931ce8b2140b2bab837e0810c0ef515bbe92de0248040b8bdd",
  "kind": 63796,
  "tags": [
    [
      "-"
    ],
    [
      "t",
      "dev"
    ],
    [
      "PCR4",
      "6386cee86c94b2a713c98e1d883134e8f2c019a17a712eb950fde15e9d6667575569c4e5c5e66eb9c920369961025fd2"
    ]
  ],
  "content": "",
  "sig": "bd9c2278beb7cd0023e3e8cb8794e1d29ac76e28182cb54240c8f56752f92019233463a643c606362dc996d303db532df88633e1a53532ee0f23d724df89e1dd"
}

Anyone who discovers the instance event can validate the supplied attestation in the content against build and instance tags and decide if they are willing to trust the instance. They could then communicate to the service pubkey using a relay specified in the relay tag. Verification code prototype is available at nostr-enclaves.

FIXME prod/dev build signature tags?

Admin API

To import a key into noauth-enclaved you can use nip46-like protocol using kind:24135 (instead of kind:24133). Requests must target service pubkey and must be signed by the user key. Methods:

method	params	result	description
ping	[]	"pong"	check if signer is alive
has_key	[]	"true" OR "false"	check if caller's key is imported
import_key	[<privkey>, <comma-separated-nip46-relays>]	"ok"	import caller's key
connect_key	[<privkey>, <app_pubkey>, <comma-separated-nip46-relays>]	"ok"	import caller's key and connect to app_pubkey with full perms
delete_key	[]	"ok"	delete caller's key
generate_test_key	[<comma-separated-nip46-relays>]	<bunker-url>	create new key valid for 1 day with full perms and return bunker url

Importing the nsec

DANGER: do not use your real nsec! This is experimental tech!

First, find an instance service pubkey:

SERVICE_PUBKEY=`echo '{"kinds":[63793], "limit": 1}' | nak req wss://relay.primal.net | jq .pubkey`

The wss://relay.primal.net is an outbox relay of the launcher of the dev instance.

Then import your nsec:

echo ${NSEC} | tsx src/index.ts cli import_key wss://relay.nsec.app ${SERVICE_PUBKEY}

The wss://relay.nsec.app is announced in the kind:63793 event above.

Note that the enclave does not process nip46 connect requests - you need to import the nsec into nsec.app first, then establish a connection to some client, then log-out in nsec.app and import the key into the enclave. After that, nip46 requests sent by the client will be served by the enclave.

Another method to import a key without depending on nsec.app is connect_key - it imports your nsec and connects it to a client pubkey you provide and gives full permissions to it:

echo ${NSEC} | tsx src/index.ts cli connect_key wss://relay.nsec.app ${SERVICE_PUBKEY} ${CLIENT_PUBKEY}

To delete your key call delete_key:

echo ${NSEC} | tsx src/index.ts cli delete_key wss://relay.nsec.app ${SERVICE_PUBKEY}

To generate a test key with a reusable bunker url and full permissions, valid for 1 day:

tsx src/index.ts cli generate_test_key wss://relay.nsec.app ${SERVICE_PUBKEY} # returns a bunker url

// FIXME

• publishing build reproduction/review event